Please note that this is part three of a three-part discussion
Significantly-built into the notion discussed in part two- is the concept that the inferential transmission of our justification does not need to be deductive, but rather can be probabilistic or inductive. Epistemologist Robert Audi, in The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy, states, “Superstructure beliefs may be only inductively, [...]

Please note that this is part two of a three part discussion
Empirical foundationalist Roderick Chisholm posits in The Myth of the Given that memory and perception are fallible and are some what a matter of coherence. Yet, he also thinks they belong to the class of justified basic beliefs. Why? Because we are human, our [...]

Please note that this is part one of a three part discussion

Foundationalism dictates that knowledge, in the form of justified true belief, must be grounded in immediately evident, or non-inferentially justified basic beliefs. It therefore condones a form of knowledge that is hierarchichal, with epistemic chains arising from these basic beliefs. Coherentism, on the other [...]